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Wholesale and retail trade a￿liates owned by parent ￿rms in manufacturing account
for a considerable fraction of overall a￿liate sales. Although quantitatively impor-
tant, this Export-Supporting FDI (ESFDI) activity has received little attention in
the literature. This paper includes ESFDI into a model of trade and horizontal FDI
with heterogeneous ￿rms. ESFDI is characterized by export-supporting distribution
and service activities in the foreign market while production remains in the home
country. This introduces some complementarity between trade and FDI. In the model
falling trade costs lead to an increase in both overall trade and overall FDI activ-
ity. This provides a possible explanation for the simultaneous rise in trade and FDI
in the data. An empirical analysis using German ￿rm level FDI data con￿rms the
quantitative importance of ESFDI. The data also support crucial implications of the
theoretical model. Parents choosing ESFDI are smaller than ￿rms choosing to pro-
duce in the foreign market. And the importance of ESFDI relative to horizontal FDI
is strongest when variable trade costs are low.
JEL: F12, F23
Keywords: exports, horizontal FDI, multinational companies, wholesale tradeNon-technical summary
Wholesale and retail trade a￿liates owned by manufacturing multinationals account for a con-
siderable fraction of overall a￿liate sales. Although quantitatively important, such Export-
Supporting FDI (ESFDI) activities have received little attention in the literature. This paper
provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of this quantitatively important type of FDI.
In the theoretical section ESFDI is introduced into a model of trade and FDI along the lines
of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). Firms with an ESFDI a￿liate in a foreign market can
use this a￿liate to carry out distribution and importing activities at a lower cost compared to
organizing these tasks from the headquarters. The two alternative modes of serving the foreign
market are ‘classic’ exporting and horizontal FDI (HFDI). In the former case both production
and distribution for the foreign market take place at home. In the latter, both activities are
located directly in the destination market.
In the equilibrium of the model ￿rms self select according to their productivity levels: the most
productive ￿rms choose HFDI and less productive ￿rms choose ‘classic’ exporting. Firms with
intermediate productivity levels choose ESFDI.
While ‘classic’ exporting and HFDI are substitutes, ESFDI involves both trade and FDI activity.
It thus introduces some degree of complementarity between trade and FDI, which is in line with
the empirical evidence.
The model also provides a possible mechanism for the conjecture of Neary (2009) that a fall
in variable trade costs might have caused the simultaneous increase in trade and FDI over the
1990s. It is shown that a fall in variable trade costs leads to an unambiguous increase in ESFDI
activity. In line with the data, this implies a simultaneous increase in trade and FDI activity.
The empirical section uses the MiDi data from the Deutsche Bundesbank to outline the impor-
tance of ESFDI in the FDI activity of German multinationals. It is shown that ESFDI is indeed a
quantitatively important way of serving foreign markets: in many sectors there are more ESFDI
a￿liates than HFDI a￿liates and in some sectors sales of ESFDI a￿liates are even higher than
sales of HFDI a￿liates.
The data are also used to test two central implications of the model. To test the productivity
ranking of parent ￿rms, the six major destination markets of German FDI (France, Italy, US,
Great Britain, Japan and Spain) are considered separately. Using parent size as proxy for pro-
ductivity, the evidence is clearly supporting the ranking implied by the model.
The second implication of the model that is con￿rmed by the data is the impact of variable
trade costs (proxied by geographical distance) on the relative importance of ESFDI. In line with
the model it is shown that the fraction of ESFDI in overall FDI is the higher the closer the
destination market is to Germany.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Ein betr￿ achtlicher Anteil der Ums￿ atze multinationaler Unternehmen im produzierenden Gewerbe
wird von Tochter￿rmen im Bereich des Gross- und Einzelhandels erzielt. Obgleich quantitativ
bedeutsam, hat diese Form von ‘export-unterst￿ utzenden’ Direktinvestitionen (ESFDI) wenig
Aufmerksamkeit in der Literatur erfahren. In diesem Aufsatz wird dieses Ph￿ anomen sowohl the-
oretisch als auch empirisch untersucht.
In der theoretischen Analyse wird ESFDI in ein Modell von internationalem Handel und aus-
l￿ andischen Direktinvestitionen (FDI) mit heterogenen Firmen nach dem Vorbild von Helpman,
Melitz und Yeaple (2004) integriert. Unternehmen mit einer ESFDI-Niederlassung k￿ onnen diese
nutzen, um Import- und Vertriebsaktivit￿ aten zu geringeren Kosten durchzuf￿ uhren als Firmen,
die ihre Exportaktivit￿ aten vom Unternehmenssitz aus organisieren. Alternativ zu ESFDI k￿ onnen
Firmen den ausl￿ andischen Markt durch ‘klassisches’ Exportieren und horizontale Direktinvesti-
tionen (HFDI) bedienen. W￿ ahrend im ersten Fall Produktion und Vertrieb im Heimatland
lokalisiert sind, werden im letzteren beide Aktivit￿ aten direkt im Zielland ausgef￿ uhrt.
Das Modell impliziert eine Selbstselektion der Firmen nach ihren Produktivit￿ atsniveaus: Die
produktivsten Firmen w￿ ahlen HFDI und weniger produktive Firmen w￿ ahlen das ‘klassische’ Ex-
portieren. Firmen mit mittleren Produktivit￿ atsniveaus w￿ ahlen ESFDI.
Die Analyse wirft ein neues Licht auf die Frage, ob Exporte und Direktinvestitionen Kom-
plemente oder Substitute sind. W￿ ahrend ‘klassisches’ Exportieren und HFDI Substitute sind,
beinhaltet ESFDI beide Aktivit￿ aten und f￿ uhrt so ein Element der Komplementarit￿ at in das
Modell ein. Diese Komplementarit￿ at ist in ￿ Ubereinstimmung mit existierenden empirischen Re-
sultaten.
Auch f￿ ur die Vermutung von Neary (2009), dass sinkende variable Handelskosten in den 1990er
Jahren zu einem simultanen Anstieg von Handel und Direktinvestitionen gef￿ uhrt haben, liefert
das Modell eine m￿ ogliche Erkl￿ arung. Die Analyse zeigt, dass sinkende Handelskosten zu einem
unzweideutigen Anstieg der ESFDI-Aktivit￿ aten f￿ uhren, was zu einem simultanen Anstieg von
Handel und ausl￿ andischen Direktinvestitionen f￿ uhrt.
Im empirischen Teil der Analyse werden die MiDi Daten der Deutschen Bundesbank verwen-
det, um die quantitative Bedeutung von ESFDI f￿ ur deutsche multinationale Unternehmen zu
belegen. Es wird gezeigt, dass ESFDI in der Tat quantitativ wichtig ist: In vielen Sektoren gibt
es mehr ESFDI-T￿ ochter als HFDI-T￿ ochter und in einigen Sektoren haben diese sogar h￿ ohere
Ums￿ atze als die HFDI-T￿ ochter.
Die Daten werden dar￿ uber hinaus verwendet, um zwei wichtige Vorhersagen des Modells zutesten. Das Model impliziert, dass produktivere Firmen tendenziell HFDI w￿ ahlen sollten. Diese
Vorhersage wird f￿ ur die sechs wichtigsten Ziell￿ ander (Frankreich, Italien, Vereinigte Staaten,
Gro￿britannien, Japan und Spanien) separat ￿ uberpr￿ uft und erfolgreich best￿ atigt. Die zweite
getestete Vorhersage des Modells bezieht sich auf den Ein￿uss variabler Handelskosten (approx-
imiert durch geographische Distanz) auf die Bedeutung von ESFDI relativ zu HFDI. Wie vom
Model vorhergesagt, ist der Anteil von ESFDI in den gesamten FDI-Aktivit￿ aten umso h￿ oher, je
n￿ aher die Zielm￿ arkte an Deutschland liegen.Contents
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1 Introduction
The literature on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activity focuses almost exclusively on
production activities in foreign countries. 1 Despite their quantitative importance, FDI activities
that focus on distribution of goods imported from the parent have been widely ignored by the
literature.2 I label this type of activities ‘Export-Supporting’ FDI (ESFDI).
To see the quantitative importance of ESFDI, consider the sales of wholesale and retail a￿liates
owned by manufacturing parents as a proxy for ESFDI. Taking the German example, Table 1
displays sales of foreign a￿liates owned by parents in the manufacturing sector in 2001. 3 The
sales volume is reported by sector of the parent and by sector of the a￿liate. Two clear patterns
stand out. First, the largest part of foreign sales is accounted for by a￿liates that belong to the
same manufacturing sector as the parent ￿rm (the diagonal), while the o￿-diagonal elements are
rather small. Second, the only column with high volumes is column ‘Who/Ret’, which represents
sales of a￿liates in the wholesale and retail sector. The last column displays the ratio of sales by
wholesale a￿liates over the sales of a￿liates that are in the same manufacturing sector as their
parent. Ratios tend to be roughly between 0:3 and 1. This shows that serving foreign markets
via wholesale a￿liates is indeed a quantitatively important strategy for German multinational
companies (MNCs) in the manufacturing sector. 4
Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on FDI focuses on the location decision of pro-
duction. The pattern in the table suggests, however, that FDI in ‘export-supporting’ activities
plays an important role for the investment strategy of manufacturing parents. The aim of this
paper is to analyze this phenomenon both theoretically and empirically.
In the model developed in section 3, the process of providing consumers with a ￿nal good re-
￿ I am grateful to Giancarlo Corsetti and Morten Ravn for constant advice. I am particularly grateful to J￿ orn
Kleinert and Farid Toubal for their invaluable advice for handling the MiDi data. I would also like to thank
Itai Agur, Jonathan Eaton, Karolina Ekholm, Heinz Herrmann, Alexander Lipponer, Keith Maskus, Valeria
Merlo, Assaf Razin, Beatrix Stejskal-Passler, Jim Tybout, Carolina Villegas-Sanchez, participants of seminars at
the Banca d’Italia, the Paris School of Economics, the 6th MiDi Workshop at the Deutsche Bundesbank, the
Aarhus School of Business, the EUI working group on international trade and the EUI Macro Group for fruitful
discussions and comments. I would also like to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank for its hospitality in 2008 and
2009. All remaining errors are mine. This paper is a revised and extended version of the EUI working paper
2007/24. This work was supported by the R￿ egion Ile-de-France.
Sebastian Krautheim, Paris School of Economics, Campus Paris 1, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106/112,
bvd. de l’H^ opital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13. Email: sebastian.krautheim@eui.eu.
1See e.g. Markusen and Maskus (2003) for a survey of the literature.
2An important exception is work by Head and Ries (2001). Their paper and other related articles will be
discussed below.
3The data will be described below, it is taken from a con￿dential ￿rm-level data set of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, which contains the universe of German outward FDI (above a reporting threshold).
4Using data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) ￿nd a very
similar pattern for sales of a￿liates owned by US manufacturing parents.
1Sales of foreign a￿liates by sector of the parent and by sector of the a￿liate in 2001
sector a￿liate
parent DA DB/DC DE DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN Who/Ret ratio
Food DA 3685 * * 2829 0.77
Textiles DB/DC 2656 * * * 117 12437 4.68
Paper DE 3541 * * * 1977 0.56
Chemicals DG 63723 209 * 277 382 * 18983 0.30
Plastic DH * 16 36 * 8508 43 10 49 1747 * 1940 0.23
Minerals DI 143 * * 80 5040 * 38 * * 736 0.15
Metal DJ * * 179 * 8723 158 8 655 * 3599 0.41
Machinery DK 7 2897 465 * 879 17550 850 1420 18350 1.05
Electr. Equip. DL * * 20 * 41 3342 35444 6961 14714 0.42
Transp. Equip. DM * 30 * 142 167 364 163521 293 126118 0.77
Other Mfg. DN * * 527 891 1.69
Table 1: Sales of foreign a￿liates by sector of the German manufacturing parent and by sector of the foreign
a￿liate in 2001 (in million Euro). Sectors DA-DN are manufacturing sectors (for full description see, Table 2 in
the appendix) sector Who/Ret is wholesale and retail. The vast majority of sales is reported either by a￿liates
in the same manufacturing sector as the parent or by a￿liates in wholesale and retail. Under ‘ratio’ the ratio of
a￿liate sales in the wholesale and retail sector (column ‘Who/Ret’) to a￿liate sales in the parent sector (diagonal)
is reported. The stars represent (small) positive entries that are omitted to assure anonymity of the ￿rms.
quires both production and distribution related tasks, which may be carried out in separate
locations. Firms can choose to carry out production and distribution for the foreign market in
the headquarters. I label this case ‘classic’ exporting. Alternatively, ￿rms can choose to keep
production at home but shift tasks like importing and distributing goods to an ESFDI a￿liate
in the foreign market. This ESFDI investment comes at an additional ￿xed cost but reduces the
variable distribution cost abroad to the level of local ￿rms. An important feature of ESFDI is
that parents choose this alternative not to substitute exports but, on the contrary, to export
more. Finally, ￿rms can choose to open an HFDI a￿liate which carries out production and
distribution abroad. This alternative is the most costly in terms of ￿xed cost but reduces both
the variable trade cost and the distribution cost to the level of the local ￿rms.
These three alternatives of serving the foreign market are included into a model of trade and
FDI with heterogeneous ￿rms along the lines of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 5 Under
appropriate assumptions on the cost structure, the equilibrium is characterized by a produc-
tivity ranking similar to the one in their model: the most productive ￿rms do HFDI, the least
productive ￿rms (that are still productive enough to serve the foreign market) choose ‘classic’
exporting. The novel option, ESFDI, is chosen by parents with intermediate productivity levels.
These parents are productive enough to pay the ￿xed cost necessary to open an ESFDI a￿liate
in the foreign market, but their sales volume does not justify a replication of their production
facilities abroad.
The focus of the theoretical analysis is on the tradeo￿ between the three strategies of serving
the foreign market. It turns out that a fall in variable trade costs makes ESFDI more attractive
to both ‘classic’ exporters and HFDI ￿rms. ESFDI thus gains on both possible margins when
variable trade costs fall: on the one hand, the incentive to avoid variable trade costs by pro-
5Technically, the modeling is also closely related to Chaney (2008) and Melitz (2003).
2ducing in the destination market (HFDI) decreases which leads more of the productive ￿rms
to switch to ESFDI (proximity-concentration e￿ect ). On the other hand, the volume of exports
per exporter expands. The larger volume makes it pro￿table for some ￿rms that were doing
‘classic’ exporting before, to pay the higher ￿xed cost of doing ESFDI in order to improve their
export-e￿ciency (expansion e￿ect). So the number of parents choosing ESFDI unambiguously
increases when variable trade costs fall.
Since ESFDI involves trade and FDI at the same time, a fall in variable trade costs leads to a
simultaneous increase in overall export and overall FDI activity. This holds true for both the
number of a￿liates and their sales volumes as measures of FDI activity.
The model thus opens a new perspective on the issue whether FDI and exports are complements
or substitutes. While standard proximity-concentration models of trade and FDI imply that the
two are substitutes, most empirical studies ￿nd the opposite (see e.g. Blonigen (2001) for a
survey). Along these lines Neary (2009) argues that the implication of substitutability is clearly
at odds with the data: contrary to the predictions of proximity-concentration models, the 1990s
have been characterized by substantial falls in trade cost and a simultaneous increase in both
trade and FDI activity.6 From within a fairly standard monopolistic competition, proximity-
concentration framework, the model of ESFDI provides a natural rational for this pattern: when
variable trade costs fall, more ￿rms choose ESFDI which implies that trade and FDI activity
increase simultaneously.7
Broadening the analysis of an earlier version (Krautheim (2007)), this paper uses the MiDi
￿rm-level database from the Deutsche Bundesbank to analyze di￿erent aspects of ESFDI and its
relation to HFDI. The dataset I use contains the universe of German FDI activity from 1989 to
2005. The great advantage of the MiDi database is that for outward FDI it contains information
on the sector of both the parent and the a￿liate. It allows thus to distinguish between ESFDI
and HFDI.
The analysis reveals that ESFDI (measured by the number of a￿liates and a￿liate sales) plays
indeed a quantitatively important role in the FDI activity of German manufacturing ￿rms. The
evolution of ESFDI and HFDI are analyzed as well as the particular importance ESFDI plays
for German investment in Western European markets.
6He conjectures that falling trade costs were the driving force behind these patterns and proposes two directions
of research to address this positive correlation over time: export-platform FDI and oligopolistic competition with
takeovers.
7An alternative way of generating complementarity is to assume that HFDI requires some trade in intermediate
products (see Pontes (2007), Kleinert and Toubal (2008), Bombarda (2007) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opro-
molla (2009)). I view the two mechanisms as complementary: both, trade in intermediate products and ESFDI
are observed in the data and intermediate goods trade could be easily added to the model of ESFDI without
altering the main results and tradeo￿s. To focus the analysis on ESFDI, I restrict the model to the case without
trade in intermediate inputs.
3An important testable implication of the model is the clear productivity ranking between HFDI
and ESFDI parents. In a given market (and everything else equal) parents choosing HFDI should
be more productive than ￿rms choosing ESFDI. I consider the six major destination markets of
German FDI (France, Italy, US, Great Britain, Japan and Spain). Using parent size as proxy
for productivity, the evidence is clearly supporting the ranking implied by the model.
The second important testable implication of the model is the impact of a fall in variable trade
costs on the tradeo￿ between ESFDI and HFDI. The model implies that lower variable trade
costs should lead to an increase in ESFDI and a decrease in HFDI. Using distance as a proxy for
variable trade costs, it is not possible to estimate two separate gravity-type equations for ESFDI
and HFDI (country ￿xed e￿ects would have to be introduced, which would be perfectly collinear
with distance). I thus use the model to derive predictions of the impact of distance on the
importance of ESFDI relative to overall FDI activity. It turns out that this ratio only depends
on the di￿erent trade costs and is independent of any other destination market characteristics.
The empirical analysis shows that in line with the model, the share of ESFDI activity in overall
FDI activity (here: ESFDI + HFDI) decreases in distance. So the closer markets are (e.g. in
Western Europe) the higher is the share of ESFDI in overall FDI activity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the model and its equilibrium, Section 4 derives and discusses the main
theoretical results. Sections 5, 6 and 7 contain the empirical analysis.
2 Related Literature
Very few empirical studies in the literature focus explicitly on the analysis of ‘export-supporting’
FDI activities. Two notable exceptions on the empirical side are Yamawaki (1991) and Head
and Ries (2001), who use data on Japanese MNCs that includes information on the sector of
the foreign a￿liate to determine the impact of di￿erent FDI types on a ￿rm’s exports. In line
with the predictions of the model of ESFDI, they ￿nd that the presence of distribution a￿liates
tends to increase aggregate exports from Japan into the destination market.
Evidence of the quantitative importance of ESFDI activity can also be found in some empirical
works which do not address ESFDI explicitly. An early study for the US is Zeile (1997). Using
the benchmark survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on foreign direct investment
in the US, he delivers a set of stylized facts about US intra￿rm trade. He ￿nds that about one
￿fth of overall US imports goes via a wholesale a￿liate of the exporting foreign ￿rm. In a later
study, Zeile (2003) provides more details about these ￿ows: the intra￿rm imports of wholesale
a￿liates mainly consist of heterogeneous manufactured products. In most years, the imports
from the parent groups account for more than three-fourth of the total imports by wholesale
4a￿liates. He also points out that more than 96% of the imports of US wholesale a￿liates from
their foreign parent groups were goods for resale.
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) use the BEA data to provide additional information on
the structure of US FDI. Looking at majority-owned, non-bank a￿liates of U.S.-headquartered
corporations, they ￿nd the same pattern for the US as Table 1 displays for Germany: the largest
part of a￿liate sales is by a￿liates in the same sector as the parent company. But the share
of wholesale trade a￿liates in total a￿liate sales in manufacturing is considerable and reaches
from 9.7% for transport equipment, over 28% in electrical equipment up to 38% in industrial
machinery (see Table 9 in their paper).
Using the MiDi data, Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005) provide some evidence for
the relevance of ESFDI for German manufacturers. Their Table 3 plots the number of a￿liates
(summed from 1989-2001) in the same way as Table 1 plots sales for 2001: almost all a￿liates
are either in the same industry as the parent ￿rm or in wholesale and retail trade.
Additional insights from the MiDi data about wholesale FDI in German manufacturing can be
found in Kleinert and Toubal (2005) and Kleinert and Toubal (2006). These papers focus on
the trade-o￿ between trade and horizontal FDI along the lines of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004). Since the MiDi data do not contain information on trade volumes, the sales of wholesale
a￿liates are used as a proxy for trade. They thereby provide several insights on the particularities
of wholesale FDI, that also support the model of ESFDI proposed in this paper. Kleinert and
Toubal (2006) ￿nd that wholesale a￿liates have systematically lower sales than manufacturing
a￿liates. Kleinert and Toubal (2005) provide evidence for the proximity-concentration forces
between horizontal and wholesale FDI. They ￿nd that the probability of a parent ￿rm to do
production FDI instead of wholesale FDI increases in distance and decreases in a (size adjusted)
measure of average sectoral ￿xed costs. Both ￿ndings are in line with the model proposed in
this paper. In addition they ￿nd that the wage di￿erential and market size also matter. 8
On the theoretical side recent work by Felbermayr and Jung (2008) includes wholesale FDI in
the analysis. Motivated by a strand of the business literature, that underlines the importance of
trade intermediaries, they introduce an additional way of exporting into the Melitz (2003) model:
exporting in co-operation with a general importer. They interpret the ￿xed cost of exporting in
the Melitz-model as the cost of setting up a wholesale a￿liate and then analyze the trade-o￿
between the two modes of serving the foreign market. They do not consider the possibility of
production FDI and do not address any issues related to trade-o￿s between di￿erent types of
8In ongoing revision of Kleinert and Toubal (2005), the authors con￿rm their empirical results with more recent
data. In addition, they develop a simpli￿ed partial equilibrium version of the model of ESFDI with quasi-linear
preferences ￿ a la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Such a partial equilibrium structure and the quasi-linear preferences
can be used to take into account wage di￿erences and to determine the e￿ect of the ‘toughness’ of competition
on the probability to choose wholesale instead of production FDI.
5FDI which are the focus of this paper. 9
While export-supporting forms of FDI have not found much attention in the literature, the issue
of complementarity and substitutability between trade and FDI and its apparent contradiction to
proximity-concentration models has interested many authors. Blonigen (2001) gives an overview
over the large literature, which (quite in line with the model of ESFDI) ￿nds strong evidence
for complementarity on the aggregate level. Blonigen (2001) (and in the same spirit Swenson
(2004)) shows that these ￿ndings are caused by aggregation. Going to the product level, they
￿nd evidence for substitutability between exporting and producing abroad. These ￿ndings are
exactly in line with the predictions of the model of ESFDI: in the presence of ESFDI, one should
￿nd complementarity between trade and FDI on the aggregate level, while on the product level
exporting and production abroad remain substitutes.
3 The Model
3.1 The Economy
Basic structure: The world economy consists of N countries with Ln denoting the population
in country n. There are H + 1 sectors, H of which are producing di￿erentiated products, while
sector zero produces a homogeneous good with a constant returns to scale technology. The
homogeneous good is freely traded and is used as the numeraire with its price normalized to
one. Only equilibria are considered where all countries produce the homogeneous good implying
that wages are equalized across countries and can be normalized to one. Labor is the only input
in the production process. Each worker holds a share of a perfectly diversi￿ed portfolio of all
￿rms in the world.
Preferences: The workers are all identical. They share the same preferences over consumption















h is the quantity of variety x of good (sector) h, q0 is the quantity of the homogeneous
good consumed, ￿0 +
PH
h=1 ￿h = 1 and ￿h > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of sector h. In the subsequent analysis, sectoral indices will be dropped where this causes no
confusion.
Firms: The number of ￿rms in each sector is assumed to be ￿xed and proportional to country
size. No ￿rm entry and exit takes place on the national level. Production in the di￿erentiated
9Their approach could in fact be used to develop a micro foundation for the cost di￿erence between ‘classic’
exporting and ESFDI assumed in this paper.
6good sectors takes place according to a standard increasing returns to scale technology. The cost
for a ￿rm with productivity ’ in country i of producing q units of output and to sell q units in
the local market is given by c(q) =
q
’ + fii.
Firms di￿er in their productivity levels which are assumed to be drawn from a Pareto distribution
with parameter ￿ i.e. P(~ ’ < ’) = F(’) = 1 ￿ ’￿￿. Without loss of generality the minimum
productivity level is normalized to one (’min ￿ 1). Furthermore, we have to impose ￿ > (￿￿1).
This assumption assures that in equilibrium the mean of the ￿rm size distribution is ￿nite.
Tasks, location choices and the cost structure: The business of a ￿rm consists of two
tasks: production and distribution. To serve a foreign market, ￿rms have three di￿erent location
choices for performing these tasks. Firms choosing ‘classic’ exporting have to pay a ￿xed cost
of exporting fx
ij and a variable iceberg trade cost: ￿ij units need to be shipped to have one unit
arriving at the border of the destination country. As standard, ￿ij > 1 8 j 6= i and ￿ii = 1. In
addition, ‘classic’ exporters face a variable distribution cost ￿ij which is also of the iceberg type
(￿ii = 1 and ￿ij > 1 8 j 6= i).10
When ￿rms choose ESFDI they face a ￿xed cost of setting up a service a￿liate in the destination
country fd
ij. The ￿rm can transfer the distribution activities to this ESFDI a￿liate and then
faces the same distribution cost as the local ￿rms, ￿jj = 1.
The third alternative is to opt for horizontal FDI (HFDI) transferring both production and
distribution for the foreign market into the foreign country. This requires a ￿xed cost f
f
ij of
‘replicating’ the ￿rm’s activities in the foreign market. These ￿rms then face the same distribu-
tion and variable trade costs as local ￿rms: ￿jj = 1 and ￿jj = 1. Thus, a ￿rm in country i with















The indices stand for ‘classic’ exporting (x), transferring distribution management to an ESFDI
a￿liate (d) and HFDI where both tasks are carried out in the foreign market ( f).
To determine what type of ￿rms will choose which strategy to serve the foreign market, the
structure of ￿xed and variable cost plays a crucial role. Following Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004), I will focus on cost structures which allow the three alternative ways to coexist in



















10To keep the model as parsimonious as possible an iceberg distribution cost is assumed. It would be possible
to provide a micro foundation of this cost along the lines of Felbermayr and Jung (2008) who explicitly model a
distribution sector where the producer has to share its pro￿ts with a local distributor.
7Since this condition might seem a bit arbitrary, it is important to note that for the main results of





ij.11 In this case it would be possible, however, that some modes of
serving the foreign market are not chosen by any ￿rm. Condition (1) assures that all three
modes coexist, which is what we observe in the data. This condition thus allows to focus on the
empirically relevant case. All other cases (e.g. no trade, no ESFDI, only HFDI) could be easily
addressed in this framework but appear less relevant.
Demand: With the wages in all countries normalized to one, the total labor income in j
is given by Lj. Since ￿rms make positive pro￿ts the second component of income consists of
dividends paid on the shares of the global fund holding all ￿rms. Dividends received by workers
in country j are given by (Lj=L)￿ where ￿ are world pro￿ts and L stands for world population.
Demand in j for a given variety imported from i is given by








where Pj is the welfare based price index.
Prices, pro￿ts and productivity cuto￿s: Facing isoelastic demand curves, ￿rms charge a
constant mark-up over marginal costs in each market they choose to serve: pij(’) = ￿
￿￿1 mc(’).
Marginal costs are given by 1






the respective strategies x, d, and f of serving the foreign market. A ￿rm serving the domestic




￿￿￿1. In addition to



















ij(’) = Bj ’￿￿1 ￿ f
f
ij
The pro￿tability of the di￿erent options can be easily compared using Figure 1. The pro￿ts
implied by the three di￿erent strategies are plotted as a function of the productivity ( ’￿￿1) of










and Bj respectively. Like in Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) the model implies a productivity ranking, where the most productive
￿rms choose HFDI and the less productive ￿rms choose ‘classic’ exporting. New is the intro-
11This assumption can be easily justi￿ed. For example assume that f
x
ij represents some basic information
acquisition cost. f
d
ij includes this information cost plus a ￿xed cost of opening a sales o￿ce and f
f
ij includes both
costs plus the cost of setting up production capacity.
8duction of ESFDI which is chosen by ￿rms with intermediate productivity levels. The cuto￿







In order to derive the central equilibrium objects of the model, the equilibrium price index Pj
and aggregate world pro￿ts ￿ are needed. 13 Later in the analysis it will turn out that aggregate
world pro￿ts only depend on exogenous parameters of the model, ￿ will thus be treated as a
constant from now on, which later on will turn out to be justi￿ed. Under the assumption that
￿rm productivities are distributed Pareto, a closed form expression for the price index can be
derived:14
Pj = Ej￿j: (2)
Where ￿j is to be interpreted as an index of aggregate remoteness of country j and Ej collects
constant terms. It is - along with all the other terms collecting constants in the following equa-
tions - reported in the appendix.
The pro￿t functions for ￿rms choosing di￿erent strategies to serve the foreign market that were
spelled out above can be used together with (2) to derive the equilibrium cuto￿ productivity
levels associated with the three possible strategies:
￿ ’x








































implies the intercepts of the pro￿t functions. By construction, the slopes of the functions are steeper for the
modes with higher ￿xed costs. It could be that the slopes are such that e.g. only ESFDI and HFDI are chosen.
But already the simple ranking of the ￿xed costs assures that conditioned on the modes being chosen by some
￿rms the more productive ￿rms chose HFDI. The more complex condition (1) just assures that we are in the
(realistic) case where all three modes coexist.



































































































9Under condition (1), one has ￿ ’x
ij < ￿ ’d
ij < ￿ ’
f
ij which assures that all three strategies of serving
the foreign market are chosen by some ￿rms.
With the equilibrium price index in (2) and the cuto￿ productivity levels, it is now possible to
derive the relevant equilibrium objects of the analysis. Before, note that it is now also possible
to derive equilibrium ￿rm pro￿ts and to use these to derive an expression for equilibrium aggre-
gate pro￿ts. This is done in appendix C. It turns out that aggregate world pro￿ts ￿ are indeed
constant. We can thus state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the cost structure in (1), ￿rms self-select into their strategy of serving a
foreign market according to their productivity levels. The most productive ￿rms choose HFDI,
￿rms with intermediate productivity levels choose ESFDI, ￿rms with lower productivity export
and the lowest productivity ￿rms serve the domestic market only.
Proof: This follows directly from equations (1) and (3) to (5). q.e.d.
The two most frequently used measures of FDI are the number of a￿liates of ￿rms from
country i in country j and their sales. By construction, it will never be optimal for a ￿rm to
have two a￿liates in the same country (i.e. to engage in ESFDI and HFDI at the same time.
This is because the ESFDI activities are already included in the HFDI step). Thus the number
of ￿rms opting for some type of FDI maps one-to-one into the number of a￿liates. 15








of ￿rms choosing the other modes is obtained analogously:
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Given the assumptions on the cost structure in (1) all these measures are positive i.e. in equi-
librium each option to serve the foreign market is chosen by some ￿rms.
Sales of a ￿rm from country i with productivity ’ in the foreign market j are given by
sij(’) = pij(’) qij(’). The optimal price setting of the ￿rm, the demand function and the
15In the MiDi data used in the empirical section a￿liates only have to report their main activity (production
or distribution). Many a￿liates report production as their main activity but also carry out distribution activities.
The assumption hat HFDI includes both production and distribution appears thus justi￿ed.
10equilibrium price index in (2) can be used to ￿nd the equilibrium sales of a ￿rm conditioned on












Where Jj collects constants and is reported in the appendix. The aggregate sales volume of








ij(’) dF(’). Analogously for the other
modes:
Sx




































































The constant Mj is reported in the appendix. By (1) aggregate sales of all three strategies are
positive. These results allow to state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under the cost structure in (1),
(i) relative to their sales volumes classic exporters to market j are more numerous than











(ii) relative to their sales volumes ESFDI a￿liates selling in j are more numerous than













Proof: This follows directly from equations (6) to (11). q.e.d.
This proposition simply re￿ects the feature of the model that exporters have lower sales
in market j than ESFDI ￿rms, which have in turn lower sales in j than HFDI ￿rms.16 There
are two reasons for this pattern. First, modes with lower ￿xed costs are chosen by ￿rms with
lower productivities which thus choose lower sales. Second, for a given productivity level when
higher ￿xed costs need to be recovered, ￿rms choose higher sales volumes. This can be easily
seen considering e.g. ￿rms at the cuto￿ between ESFDI and HFDI: they are indi￿erent between
the two but when they choose HFDI they need higher sales to recover the higher ￿xed costs. 17
16Kleinert and Toubal (2006) show that for production and wholesale a￿liates this pattern can be found in the
MiDi data.
17This result will be referred to several times in the empirical section when the e￿ect of a reporting threshold
on a￿liate size is discussed. Since ESFDI a￿liates tend to be smaller than HFDI a￿liates, they are a￿ected
disproportionately by an increase in the reporting threshold.
113.3 The Role of Variable Trade Costs
This subsection presents three propositions which summarize the main theoretical results of the
model. In particular, they determine to which extent and why trade and FDI are complements
in the model and present testable implications.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of a fall in variable trade costs on the measure
of ￿rms self-selecting into the di￿erent strategies to serve the foreign market and their sales
volume in the foreign market.18
Proposition 3 Under the cost structure in (1), a fall in variable trade costs between market i
and market j implies for country i
(i) an increase in the measure of ‘classic’ exporters to j, an increase in the measure
of ￿rms choosing ESFDI to serve market j and a decrease in the measure of ￿rms using











(ii) an increase in the sales volume of ‘classic’ exporters in j, an increase in the sales













It is an important feature of the model that ESFDI implies both trade and FDI activity
at the same time. The following proposition summarizes the impact of variable trade costs on
overall trade and overall FDI activity.
Proposition 4 Under the cost structure in (1), a fall in variable trade costs between market i
and market j implies for overall exports and FDI activity originating in i
(i) an increase in both the measure of ￿rms exporting to country j (‘classic’ exporters











(ii) an increase in both the volume of export sales in country j (sales of ‘classic’ exporters











18Note that in the model each ￿rm has at most one a￿liate in a foreign market, so that the measure of parents
in i with a particular type of a￿liate in country j equals the measure of i a￿liates of this type in j.
19For the comparative statics, I follow Chaney (2008) in assuming that no country is large compared to the
other countries and the number of countries is su￿ciently large to assure that changes in the variable cost of trade
with one of the trading partners have no ￿rst-order e￿ect on the index of overall remoteness of the importing
country ￿j.
12Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 3 and 4 summarize the main theoretical results of the model. Before turning to
their interpretation, it is convenient to state the following proposition, which will be useful in
the empirical analysis:
Proposition 5 Under the cost structure in (1), a fall in variable trade costs between market i
and market j implies for FDI from i to j
















4 Interpretation of the Theoretical Results
This section discusses the main theoretical results on the tradeo￿ between ESFDI and HFDI,
complementarity between trade and FDI as well as the conjecture of Neary (2009) that a fall in
trade costs might have led to the simultaneous increase in trade and FDI. In addition, testable
implications are presented and discussed.
4.1 The main tradeo￿s and the increase of trade and FDI
Proposition 3 summarizes the role variable trade costs play for the main tradeo￿s in the model.
Both for the number of ￿rms serving market j as well as for the sales in market j, the model
implies that a fall in variable trade costs unambiguously increases ‘classic’ exporting and ESFDI
while HFDI decreases.
There are two e￿ects shaping this result. The ￿rst is the proximity-concentration e￿ect which
governs the tradeo￿ between HFDI and ESFDI. The incentive to pay the high ￿xed cost of HFDI
is to avoid the variable trade cost. When this cost falls, less ￿rms have an incentive to choose
HFDI, so the less productive HFDI ￿rms switch to ESFDI.
The second important e￿ect is the expansion e￿ect. Given lower variable trade costs all ￿rms
choose to increase their sales volumes. For the ‘classic’ exporters just below the ESFDI cuto￿,
it now pays to invest the higher ￿xed cost of ESFDI. 20
Taking the two e￿ects together it turns out that ESFDI gains on both possible margins when
20The same e￿ect leads additional ￿rms to newly enter the export market starting as ‘classic’ exporters. Propo-
sition 3 shows that the net e￿ect is positive both for the number of ￿rms as for the sales volumes. So the loss of
￿rms switching from ‘classic’ exporting to ESFDI is more than compensated by new exporters.
13variable trade costs fall. On both sides of the productivity distribution ￿rms start ESFDI: HFDI
￿rms close to the cuto￿ have less reason to avoid variable trade costs and thus opt for ESFDI.
On the other side of the distribution, ‘classic’ exporters close to the cuto￿ react to lower variable
costs by increasing their sales volume, which then justi￿es to pay the higher ￿xed cost of ESFDI.
Figure 2 illustrates the e￿ect of a fall in variable trade costs on the number of ￿rms. ESFDI
gains on both possible margins, while the number of HFDI a￿liates decreases and the number
of ‘classic’ exporters increases. The same holds true for the case of sales volumes, which is
illustrated in Figure 3.21
This unambiguous increase in ESFDI delivers a possible rational for the conjecture of Neary
(2009) that falling trade costs might have been the driving force behind the simultaneous increase
in trade and FDI during the 1990s. While trade and HFDI remain substitutes in the model, trade
and ESFDI clearly are complements. Proposition 4 shows that the e￿ect of falling variable trade
costs does indeed increase overall trade and overall FDI activity measured both by the number of
￿rms and sales volumes. The model thus very naturally links variable trade costs to increases in
both trade and FDI activity: falling variable trade costs favor export-supporting FDI activities,
which account for both trade and FDI.
Again, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the intuition. The increase in ESFDI leads to more trade and
more FDI activity. While the e￿ect for the number of ￿rms is clear, Figure 3 illustrates that the
switch from HFDI to ESFDI of some ￿rms decreases the sales volumes of these ￿rms as a lower
￿xed cost needs to be recovered (area C). This negative e￿ect of overall FDI sales is, however,
o￿set by the sales volume generated by ‘classic’ exporters switching to ESFDI (areas A and A’).
4.2 Testable implications
Proposition 1 provides a simple but important testable implication of the model. Under the cost
structure in (1), the model implies a clear productivity ranking, where parents with intermediate
productivity levels choose ESFDI. Less productive ￿rms opt for lower sales volumes and thus
choose the option with the lowest ￿xed costs. Very productive ￿rms choose a high sales volume
and are thus willing to pay the high ￿xed cost of HFDI to reduce their variable costs. Note that
condition (1) assures both the ranking and coexistence of the three modes. 22
The second major prediction of the model is the tradeo￿ between ESFDI and HFDI reported
in Proposition 3. A ￿rst-pass to test this prediction would be to estimate two separate grav-
ity equations for ESFDI and HFDI and compare the distance e￿ects. As most ￿rm level FDI
21For presentational convenience the graph only displays e￿ects on the extensive margin (i.e. the changes in
sales volumes caused by changes in the measures of ￿rms choosing the respective strategies). It is well understood
that a decrease in variable trade costs also increases the sales of each individual ￿rm even if it does not change
its strategy (intensive margin). Propositions 3 and 4 account for this e￿ect.






ij would be su￿cient for the ranking to be
satis￿ed.
14datasets, the MiDi dataset used in the empirical section, only contains information on one coun-
try of origin (Germany). This implies that the destination market ￿xed e￿ect, which would be
needed to account e.g. for multilateral resistance (represented in the model by the parameter
￿j) would be perfectly collinear with the distance variable. The e￿ect of distance on ESFDI and
HFDI could thus not be tested.
Proposition 5 frames the ESFDI vs. HFDI tradeo￿ in a way that can be brought to the data
more easily. The ratio of ESFDI (number and sales) over overall FDI activity (ESFDI+HFDI)
represents a measure of the relative importance of ESFDI. This relative importance basically
represents the tradeo￿ between the two alternative strategies: when variable trade costs are low,
￿rms should tend to choose ESFDI rather than HFDI, i.e. the ratio should be higher than for
the case of high variable trade costs. It can be seen that all destination speci￿c variables (except
the di￿erent cost types) a￿ect the number of ￿rms (equations (7) and (8): Kj and ￿j) and their
sales volumes (equations (10) and (11): Mj and ￿j) in exactly the same way. All these variables
cancel out when considering the ratios, while only the variables remain which truly shape the
tradeo￿. These are only trade, FDI and distribution costs. 23
5 The Export-Supporting side of German FDI
In the remainder of the paper I use ￿rm level data on ESFDI activities by German manufacturing
parents. The analysis underlines the empirical relevance of ESFDI and provides support to the
two central implications of the theoretical model: the productivity ranking and the relevance of
trade costs for the ESFDI vs. HFDI decision.
5.1 MiDi Data and Counterparts of HFDI and ESFDI:
The Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank is a comprehensive
￿rm-level dataset of German FDI activity. On the outward FDI side it contains data on all
foreign a￿liates owned by German parents. Here ‘all’ refers to the universe of a￿liates with a
minimum level of total assets of which the reporting parent holds a minimum level of shares. 24
In order to construct the empirical counterparts of ESFDI and HFDI, I use the sectoral groupings
from the MiDi database, in which there are 13 manufacturing sectors. A description of these
manufacturing sectors is provided in Table 2 in the appendix. 25 A more detailed description
23Variable trade costs, the distribution cost and the ￿xed cost could in principle all depend on distance. It will
be argued below that in our context bilateral distance is a good proxy for variable trade costs. The reason is that,
except for variable trade costs, all other cost types enter as ratios, so that even if they depend on distance, these
e￿ects tend to o￿set each other.
24In the dataset the criterion is x% of participating interests or voting rights. For simplicity, I just refer to
‘shares’ in the text.
25Note that for expositional convenience Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 only include 11 sectors. The two sectors not
included in the tabels (but included in the remainder of the analysis) are DD (Manufacture of wood and wood
products (excl. furniture)) and DF (manufacture of coke, re￿ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel). These two
sectors only account for small numbers of a￿liates and very little a￿liate sales.
15including the corresponding NACE codes is provided in Lipponer (2008) p. 24 f.
I will consider an investment as horizontal FDI (HFDI) when the a￿liate is in the same sectoral
group as the parent ￿rm.26 Since the focus of the analysis is not on the trade-o￿ between
horizontal and vertical FDI, the use of 13 relatively broad manufacturing sectors provided in
the data base appears su￿ciently detailed.
The measure of export-supporting FDI (ESFDI) includes all FDI of manufacturing parents into
the wholesales sector (NACE classi￿cation 51). Since the concept of ESFDI is slightly broader
than just wholesale FDI, the measure should also include the NACE classi￿cation 50.1 - 50.4
(sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles). For simplicity I stick to the
sectoral classi￿cation scheme of the MiDi data, using the sectoral groups \GRO" (NACE 51)
and \EIN" (NACE 50 and 52). Hardly any manufacturing ￿rms have a￿liates in the NACE 52
sectoral group (retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motor cycles; repair of personal and
household goods) so its inclusion does not a￿ect the results.
5.2 Sample size considerations:
Between 1989 and 2005 there have been several changes in reporting requirements and thus in
the composition of the data set. The two relevant dimensions are the threshold for shares held
by the parent and the total assets of the a￿liate.
The threshold for the shares varies between 10% and 50%. When data from di￿erent years is
used the sample is homogenized by keeping only majority owned a￿liates. When only data from
one particular year is analyzed the standard ‘related party’ de￿nition of more than 10% of shares
is used when possible (see e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009)). 27
An important feature of the data, which has implications for the whole empirical analysis, is
that the reporting threshold on total assets of the a￿liate increased from 0.5 million Euro to
3 million Euro between 2001 and 2002. From the model one would expect such an increase to
disproportionately reduce the presence of ESFDI a￿liates in the sample as they are smaller (see
discussion of Proposition 2) and require a lower ￿xed setup cost. We will see below that this is
precisely what we observe in the data: after the change in the reporting requirement the number
of both types of FDI drops, but the drop in the number of ESFDI a￿liates is much stronger.
Along the cross-sectional dimension a lot of relevant information on ESFDI a￿liates is thus lost
from 2002 onwards. In the regression analysis I deal with this issue by considering a sample that
26As outlined in footnote 7, the presence of trade in intermediaries between the parent and the HFDI a￿liate
does not a￿ect the tradeo￿ between ESFDI and HFDI and is thus not a concern in the empirical analysis. If
anything, the presence of trade in intermediate inputs would make it more di￿cult to ￿nd a signi￿cant impact of
variable trade cost on the ESFDI-HFDI tradeo￿.
27This is the case for the comparison of the parent size distributions in section 6 which are carried out marked
by market. Using the ‘related party’ de￿nition allows to keep a maximum number of observations. Robustness
checks show that in the majority of cases results are identical when only majority owned a￿liates are considered.
16includes a￿liates with total assets of at least 0.5 million Euro (1 million DM) until 2001. And
a second sample reaching to 2005 in which in every year only a￿liates with total assets above
3 million Euro (6 million DM) are kept. In both samples the 0.1% of a￿liates with the highest
sales are dropped. This is convenient because for some years the overall sales of a￿liates can be
signi￿cantly in￿uenced by very large single observations. 28
An additional issue is a change in the sectoral classi￿cation scheme between 1994 and 1995,
which makes the use of the sectoral classi￿cations over the full sample potentially problematic.
The change in the classi￿cation scheme brings about mostly changes within the group of man-
ufacturing sectors, so that the distinction between ‘manufacturing’ and ‘wholesale’ should be
mainly una￿ected. The years 1989 to 1995 will be included into the analysis for example when
changes of ESFDI and HFDI over time are considered. They will not be included in the regres-
sion analysis, which only reaches from 1996-2001 (sample 1) and from 1996-2005 (sample 2).
Robustness checks show that this does not a￿ect the results.
5.3 Quantitative Importance of ESFDI
Table 1 in the introduction reports the sum of all sales of foreign a￿liates by sector of the parent
and sector of the a￿liate in 2001.29 The diagonal of the table represents what has been de￿ned
as HFDI sales above: sales of a￿liates that belong to the same sector as their parent company.
The second last column (‘Who/Ret’) re￿ects ESFDI activity: sales of a￿liates in wholesale and
retail with parents in the manufacturing sector.
For most parent sectors the largest volume of sales is realized by a￿liates in the same sector as
the parent (HFDI). Relative to these numbers, most of the o￿-diagonal elements are small and
do not show a systematic pattern. The only exception are the sales volumes of wholesale and
retail a￿liates which are fairly high for all sectors. In some cases they even outweigh the HFDI
sales. This table shows that there is an FDI strategy of manufacturing ￿rms that involves the
creation of a￿liates in the wholesale and retail sector. And that this strategy is quantitatively
important.
In Tables 3 and 4 (see Appendix C) the number of a￿liates and their employment levels are
used as measures of FDI activity. Also in these cases ESFDI plays an important role in overall
FDI activity.30 We have seen in Proposition 2 that the model predicts ESFDI a￿liates to have a
28A typical example would be a large acquisition by a German multinational, which would turn a domestic ￿rm
into an a￿liate and would thus lead to a jump in aggregate a￿liate sales.
29I use data from 2001 because it is the last year before the increase in the reporting threshold on total assets.
Using data from 2005 the general patterns are identical but the more than proportional decrease in the number of
ESFDI a￿liates is visible. Results are available upon request. In 2001 the reporting threshold on shares held by the
parent varies between 10% and 50% according to the total assets of the a￿liate. To avoid an under-representation
of of smaller a￿liates, only majority owned a￿liates are considered.
30Employment is a slightly problematic variable because it was not mandatory for ￿rms to report it before
2004. Missing values were estimated by the Bundesbank based on sales volume. I thus focus on the number of
a￿liates and sales volume. Results on employment are reported for completeness.
17higher share in the number of a￿liates than in a￿liate sales. This stems from the fact that they
have lower sales than HFDI a￿liates. Comparing the ‘ratio’ terms in Tables 1 and 3 it turns out
that this prediction of the model is con￿rmed in 8 of the 11 reported sectors. In line with the
predictions of the model, in most sectors the ratio ESFDI/HFDI is much higher for the number
of a￿liates than for a￿liate sales volume. For two sectors (Transportation Equipment and Other
Manufacturing) the ratios are about equal, and only for Textiles the pattern is reversed.
5.4 ESFDI over Time and in Europe:
The ￿rst graph in Figure 4 plots the number of ESFDI and HFDI a￿liates for the sample from
1989 to 2005 with all majority owned a￿liates and total assets above 0.5 million Euro. After
the change in the reporting requirement from 2001 to 2002, the absolute number of both HFDI
and ESFDI almost halves. Until 2001 there are more ESFDI a￿liates than HFDI a￿liates in the
sample, afterwards the number of ESFDI a￿liates falls below the number of HFDI a￿liates. In
line with the considerations made above, this shows that the increase of the reporting require-
ments on total assets from 0.5 million to 3 million has indeed led to a more than proportional
reduction of ESFDI a￿liates in the sample. Thus, only using a￿liates with total assets above 3
million will make it more di￿cult to con￿rm the predictions of the theoretical model as many
relevant observations are lost.
Using the homogenized sample of a￿liates with total assets above 3 million Euro, the second
graph in Figure 4 shows the increase over time of German a￿liates’ sales volumes. Over the sam-
ple period, a￿liate sales of both types of a￿liates have strongly increased. The rise in ESFDI
sales is particularly pronounced after 1993.
Also using the MiDi data, Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005) show that European
host countries play a crucial role in German FDI activity. The graph in the lower left corner
of Figure 4 shows the number of ESFDI and HFDI a￿liates for Western Europe. Relative to
HFDI, ESFDI plays a more important role for German FDI in Western Europe than for FDI in
the whole world plotted in the ￿rst graph. Provided that variable trade costs between Germany
and the rest of Western Europe are low, this is exactly what we would expect from the model.
Apart from this, the overall pattern is quite similar to the sample including the whole world.
As for the whole world, the increase in the reporting requirement for total assets has a stronger
impact on ESFDI a￿liates than on HFDI a￿liates.
The pattern for Eastern Europe is quite di￿erent. The last graph in Figure 4 plots the number
of a￿liates for Eastern European host countries. Two features stand out: ￿rstly, HFDI clearly
dominates and, secondly, we observe a very fast increase over time basically starting from zero
in 1990.
For testing the model of ESFDI, the use of Eastern European data thus appears problematic
18for at least two reasons. First, the data for Eastern Europe clearly re￿ect an adjustment process
after these countries have opened up to German FDI around 1990 while the model is constructed
to analyze and compare steady states. Second, during this adjustment process, factor price dif-
ferences (which are not included in the theoretical model) have played a crucial role (see e.g.
see Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005)). This ‘particularity’ of the Eastern European
countries for German FDI will be accounted for in the subsequent analysis.
6 Distributions of Parents’ Productivities
According to Proposition 1 ￿rms doing HFDI are more productive than ￿rms that choose ESFDI.
When in the empirical analysis only noisy measures of the ‘true’ productivities are available,
one would not expect to ￿nd the strict ordering implied by the model. Parents with the same
observed productivities choose di￿erent types of FDI if their ‘true’ productivities are su￿ciently
di￿erent. So the two CDFs of the productivity measures should be distinct, but their domains
could overlap.
To determine whether ￿rms choosing HFDI are indeed systematically more productive, I test
whether the CDF of their size measures ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the CDF of ESFDI
parents. This is standard in the literature (see e.g. Delgado, Farinas, and Ruano (2002) and
Girma, G￿ org, and Strobl (2004)).
6.1 Testing for Stochastic Dominance using the MiDi Data
Three potential problems arise when comparing such distributions using the MiDi data. First,
there is no direct measure of ￿rm productivity in the data. Second, (consistent with the model)
one and the same parent might choose ESFDI in one market, and HFDI in the other. And ￿nally,
in the data some ￿rms might have more than one a￿liate in a given market and these a￿liates
can even be of the ESFDI and HFDI type. 31
Since no direct productivity measures are available in the data, I exploit the direct link between
￿rm productivity and ￿rm size in the model (in fact, Proposition 1 can be rewritten in terms
of size) using total assets of the parent to proxy for its size. 32 We have seen above that a large
number of ESFDI observations is lost after the change in the reporting requirements from 2001
to 2002. Unfortunately size measures for the parent ￿rm are only available from 2002 onwards. So
the sample used to ￿nd support for the productivity ranking is biased against ESFDI a￿liates.
This is expected to make it more di￿cult to establish a signi￿cant di￿erence between the CDFs.
The model implies that depending on trade costs and market size, one and the same parent
31It turns out, however, that only a relatively small number of parents has ESFDI and HFDI a￿liates in the
same country.
32Results for sales as size measure are almost identical to the results for total assets.
19might have an ESFDI a￿liate in one market and an HFDI a￿liate in an other. To have a clearer
classi￿cation of parents, I look at the di￿erent distribution functions country by country for the
most important destination markets of German FDI. 33
Finally, ￿rms in the model will choose only one type of FDI in one particular destination.
Reality is a bit more complex: some parents have both types of a￿liates in the same country.
Their number, however, is relatively small (between 7% for Great Britain and 11% for France
in 2005). I determine for each parent which of the two FDI types has the larger sales and assign
the respective category to the parent. 34
Table 5 describes the composition of the samples used to analyze the CDFs. 35 The destination
countries were chosen according to the number of a￿liates. Except for Japan, the number of
ESFDI and HFDI a￿liates is relatively balanced. On the side of the parents, it turns out that
most have only one a￿liate in the respective country. Only about half of the parents with more
than one a￿liate have an HFDI and an ESFDI a￿liate. Moreover, the number of a￿liates
decreases very quickly: there are hardly any parents with more than ￿ve a￿liates per market.
6.2 Results:
Figure 5 plots the cumulative distribution functions of parents mainly engaging in one of the
two FDI types market by market. In each graph the dashed blue line represents the CDF of
the total assets (in logs) of ESFDI parents while the solid red line represents the CDF of HFDI
parents.
For France, US, Italy and Japan, a relatively clear pattern emerges: the CDF of the parents
with ESFDI a￿liates tends to be to the left of the CDF of the parents engaging in HFDI. As
predicted by the theoretical model, these ￿ndings suggest that ￿rms choosing ESFDI to serve
a foreign market tend to be smaller than ￿rms which serve the same market via HFDI. In the
cases of Great Britain and Spain, the pattern is not clear-cut. This feature will be discussed in
detail below.36
The distributions can be distinguished formally using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test)
for ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. The results of the KS tests for both total assets and sales
33Namely France, US, GB, Italy, Spain and Japan.
34Robustness checks show that results are not sensitive to the precise criterion. Taking for example France,
when only parents are included where one type of FDI sales dominates at least 2:1, results remain una￿ected.
35Considering the size distributions market by market strongly reduces the number of observations. In order to
keep as many observations as possible, I use the standard related party de￿nition i.e. all cases where the German
￿rm owns at least 10% of the foreign ￿rm are included. Robustness checks (available upon request) show that all
results are identical when only majority owned a￿liates are considered. The only exception is Japan, where the
number of HFDI parents becomes so low that a comparison of the distributions is not possible.
36It should be noted that for some smaller countries like e.g. Belgium, the pattern reverses. Since for small
countries the number of observations tends to be small, it is problematic to draw general conclusions from their
example. In addition, many small markets in Europe are so strongly integrated with their larger neighbors (often
even sharing a language) that when looking at market access motives of FDI it might be more appropriate to
treat them like economic regions of larger countries.
20as measures of the parents’ size are presented in Table 6. As an illustrative example take the
cell for France-total assets. The hypothesis that the ESFDI group has smaller values cannot be
rejected (p = 0:55), the opposite hypothesis that HFDI group has smaller values is rejected at
the 5% con￿dence level (p = 0:023) and so is the hypothesis that the two distributions are the
same (p = 0:046).
The formal tests con￿rm the results of the casual observation of the graphs in Figure 5: for
France, US, Italy and Japan they mostly suggest that the distributions are signi￿cantly di￿er-
ent and that the distributions of ￿rms choosing HFDI ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the
distributions of ￿rms opting for ESFDI. These conclusions remain also valid when the parents’
sales are used as a proxy for size (and thus productivity).
Although, overall, the evidence clearly supports the theoretical predictions, two features stand
out that appear not to be in line with the model. First, when looking at small parents, with
the exception of Japan, the CDF of the ESFDI parents tends to be to the right of the HFDI
parents’ CDF. Second, the predicted size ranking can not be con￿rmed for Great Britain and
Spain. The next subsection suggests an explanation for both patterns.
6.3 Why are there so many small HFDI parents in the sample?
The model implies that (even when a noisy productivity measure is used) the CDF of the ESFDI
parents should be to the left of the HFDI parents’ CDF for any level of parent size. But (with
the exception of Japan) for the low levels of parent size the CDF of the ESFDI parents is slightly
to the right of the CDF of HFDI parents for the smallest parent ￿rms. This pattern is reversed
quickly and it does not a￿ect the overall conclusions drawn above. It seems nevertheless to
contradict the model that there are so many small HFDI parents in the sample.
The pattern is, however, in line with the model when there is a reporting threshold on a￿liate
size (not parent size), which is the case in the MiDi data. The reason is that ESFDI parents
tend to have smaller a￿liates.37 For a given level of observed parent size an ESFDI parent is
thus more likely to be dropped than an HFDI parent. This can explain why for small parents
HFDI dominates: a more than proportional number of ESFDI parents with the same observed
productivity levels have been dropped from the sample because their a￿liates are too small.
Based on this reasoning one would expect this e￿ect to die out progressively, which can actually
be observed in all the graphs.
The same mechanism delivers a possible explanation for the pattern observed for Great Britain
37We have seen above that when measuring size by a￿liate sales there are two reasons for this. First, ESFDI
parents tend to have a lower true productivity, so for a given level of a noisy productivity measure HFDI parents
should have (on average) higher true productivities (that is why they self-selected into HFDI). Second, when
ESFDI is chosen, lower ￿xed cost need to be recovered which decreases the optimal sales level even for identical
true productivity levels. In addition, the lower ￿xed costs of ESFDI directly imply that ESFDI a￿liates are
expected to have lower total assets.
21and Spain. Although the CDFs are quite close to each other, it can be seen in both cases that the
ESFDI parents’ CDF is to the right of the CDF of HFDI parents (contradicting the theoretical
prediction) for small parents. But for higher parent sales it switches to the left. We have just
seen that for low parent sizes the sample is strongly biased against ESFDI parents. But the bias
should die out for higher values of parent sales. And indeed, when smaller parents are dropped,
the pattern predicted by the model emerges. When about the smaller half of parents of each type
are dropped, the null of ESFDI parents being smaller than HFDI parents cannot be rejected,
while the opposite hypothesis is rejected at least at the 10% signi￿cance level. 38
Despite the bias introduced by the reporting threshold on a￿liate size, the data on the six most
important host markets for German FDI activity clearly support a crucial prediction of the
model: HFDI parents tend to be larger than ESFDI parents.
7 Trade Costs and the Relative Importance of ESFDI
We have seen in Proposition 3 that variable trade costs play a crucial role for the trade-o￿
between ESFDI and HFDI. As outlined above, it is not possible to estimate two separate grav-
ity equations for ESFDI and HFDI and compare the distance e￿ects, since the model implies
that destination ￿xed e￿ects have to be included into the regression. These would be perfectly
collinear with the distance variable.
Similar in spirit to Brainard (1997), I deal with this issue by using ratios as dependent variable.
In this case, all terms that would require the introduction of destination ￿xed e￿ects cancel out
and only the di￿erent cost terms remain. The predictions of the model for the e￿ect of variable
trade costs on the ratios are summarized in Proposition 5: lower variable trade costs increase
ESFDI activity relative to overall FDI activity.
7.1 Distance and the relative importance of ESFDI
As standard in the empirical literature on trade and FDI, I use bilateral distance as a proxy
for variable trade costs. A potential problem could be that the di￿erent ￿xed costs and the
distribution cost might also depend on distance. It is argued in the appendix F.1 that when
considering ratios it appears justi￿ed to use distance as a proxy for variable costs only. 39









i ) on the logarithm of geographic distance between Germany and
the destination market. Furthermore, a constant and sets of sectoral and year dummies are
38The only exception is the case of Spain when total sales are used as a size proxy. In this case the CDFs do
not di￿er signi￿cantly. Results of the KS tests are available upon request.
39In the ratios, all costs (except the variable trade cost) have a countervailing corresponding term. So as long
as these costs depend on distance in a ‘similar’ way, the distance e￿ects in the ratios will o￿set. Distance then
only enters via the variable trade cost, which is the only cost not entering the expressions in a ratio.
22included in the regression.
Each observation is constructed summing the ￿rm level ESFDI and HFDI variables by year,
destination and parent sector. So all a￿liates which (a) in in the same year, are (b) located
in the same host country and (c) belong to parent ￿rms that are in the same sector, form one
observation. The size of these groups varies between several hundreds for popular destination-
sector combinations and zero for unpopular ones. 40 To account for these variations, I use the
inverse of the total size of the sub-group to weight the variance.
We have seen above that German FDI activity in Eastern Europe di￿ers from FDI activity
in the rest of the world. Proximity, factor price di￿erences and the radical adjustment process
after 1989 (starting from zero) render Eastern Europe a very special case. I account for this
particularity by adding a dummy variable that takes the value of unity when the host country
is the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland or the Slovak Republic.
In my preferred speci￿cation I use the data sample from 1996-2001, which is cross-sectionally
richer because it contains all a￿liates with total assets above 0 :5 million Euro (Sample 1).
Sample 2 has a longer time dimension (1996-2005) but only uses a￿liates with total assets
above 3 million Euro. Results of the weighted least squares regressions are reported in Table 7.
The ￿rst two rows are the regressions with the (log of the) ratio of sales as dependent variable.
The coe￿cients of bilateral distance are signi￿cant and have the expected (negative) sign. When
the dummy dEAST for the 5 Eastern European countries is introduced, it is highly signi￿cant
and also increases the distance coe￿cient as well as its signi￿cance level. For the number of
a￿liates as dependent variable, the coe￿cient on distance has the expected sign but is not
signi￿cant. It does, however, become highly signi￿cant when the dEAST dummy is included.
Results for sample 2 are very similar.
The strong impact of the dummy for Eastern Europe on the level of the distance coe￿cients and
the signi￿cance levels suggests that German FDI activity in these counties is driven by forces
outside the model. By the same token the results imply that for the sample without the ￿ve
Eastern European countries the predictions of the model are con￿rmed in the data.
The results of the baseline regressions provide strong support for a crucial implication of the
model, namely that when variable trade costs increase, the share of ESFDI in overall FDI activity
decreases. It is worth pointing out that this is not a trivial result in the sense that gravity-type
equations seem to work pretty well most of the time. Without the guidance of the model of
ESFDI and heterogeneous ￿rms, it would a priory not have been obvious at all how distance
should a￿ect the ratio of two di￿erent types of FDI. The fact that all coe￿cients on distance have
40In the sample used in the baseline speci￿cation groups were dropped when one of the two FDI types is not
represented at all. Robustness checks presented below show that dropping these observations does not a￿ect the
qualitative results.
23the expected sign and most of them are highly signi￿cant (both statistically and economically),
suggests that the theoretical model reveals an important relation between ESFDI and HFDI.
7.2 Robustness Checks for the Distance Regressions:
Adding 1989 to 1995: The ￿rst rows in Table 8 report the results of the same regressions
as in the baseline case, but based on a longer sample (sample R1), which also includes the years
between 1989 and 1995. Due to the uncertain e￿ects of the change in sectoral classi￿cations
discussed above, these years were not included into the baseline speci￿cation. The results are
qualitatively identical to the benchmark case. Overall, the increased sample size leads to higher
signi￿cance levels. In particular, the distance coe￿cients are now signi￿cant at the 10% level
also for the number of a￿liates even when no dummy for Eastern Europe is included.
No sectoral dummies: Using a similar dataset for the US, Yeaple (2008) analyzes the dif-
ferent margins of adjustment of FDI to trade barriers in a gravity context. Although his data
contains sectoral information, his preferred speci￿cation is the one in which he sums across all
sectors. This leaves him with one observation per destination market. He argues that this is
preferable to using observations at the destination-sector level because of the very large number
of destination-sector combinations that actually have zero FDI.
While this is a concern when the dependent variables are in levels, this seems less of a problem
when looking at the ratios of two types of FDI in one particular (year - destination - parent sec-
tor) group. If both types of FDI are zero, there is nothing to be learned about the determinants
of the ratio.41
In sample R2 all observations have been summed across sectors so that we are left with one
observation per year-destination combination. Standard errors are still clustered by country
(because we have six years in the sample, there are up to six observations for each country).
The results are very similar to the baseline speci￿cation where information about the sector of
the parent company is included.
Keeping ‘one-sided’ zeros: In the baseline speci￿cation, all observations with zero HFDI
and/or zero ESFDI values have been dropped. A recent literature (see e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008) or Felbermayr and Kohler (2005)) argues that in gravity equations the zero
observations provide valuable information (namely: trade ￿ows could be positive but are zero).
When the dependent variables are ratios, observations in which both ESFDI and HFDI are zero
do not provide any relevant information. In the case where one type of FDI is positive but the
other is zero, ￿rms choose one type of FDI but not the other so that a ‘zero’ contains valuable
41The case conceptually relevant case where only one type of FDI is observed in a destination-sector combination
will be addressed below. Including these ‘one-sided’ zeros does not a￿ect the conclusions drawn from the baseline
speci￿cation.
24information.
When in some year - destination - parent sector combination no ESFDI takes place (but HFDI
does), the ratio becomes zero which is a problem when taking logs. I add one unit of measurement
to the ‘number’ and ‘sales’ variables to circumvent this problem. An observation with zero ESFDI
and 10 HFDI a￿liates, would be transformed into nd = 1 and nf = 11. This transformation
induces a bias, but the larger the sub-group, the lower the bias. Using weighted least squares,
the observations with the lowest bias receive the highest weight, so that this does not appear to
be a major concern.
The results of the same regressions as in the baseline speci￿cation but based on the transformed
sample are reported under sample R3 in Table 8. The results are quite similar to the baseline
speci￿cation. Taking into account the ‘one-sided’ zero observation does not change the results.
8 Conclusions
Despite the empirical relevance of ‘Export-Supporting’ FDI in the data, the FDI literature fo-
cuses almost exclusively on production activities in foreign countries.
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable model of trade, ESFDI and
HFDI with heterogeneous ￿rms along the lines of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). ESFDI
involves both export and FDI activity so that more ESFDI implies more trade. It thus provides a
possible explanation for the complementarity usually found between trade and FDI in the data.
The model also implies that a decrease in variable trade costs leads to an unambiguous increase
in ESFDI. This provides a simple mechanism within a proximity-concentration framework that
can rationalize the simultaneous increase of trade and FDI in periods of falling trade costs.
An empirical analysis using German ￿rm level FDI data con￿rms that ESFDI is a quantita-
tively important strategy of German multinationals in the manufacturing sector. Two crucial
implications of the model ￿nd support in the data: HFDI parents tend to be larger than ESFDI
parents and ESFDI plays a more important role in markets closer to Germany.
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Figure 1: Pro￿ts from ‘classic’ exporting ￿x, FDI-supported exporting ￿d and HFDI with pro-





re￿ected by the intercepts. Condition (1) as a whole assures that also the slopes are such that
each strategy is optimal for some ￿rms, which is in line with the coexistence of exports, ESFDI
and HFDI observed in the data.
A.2 Constant Terms












































































































29A.3 Aggregate World Pro￿ts





































kl (’) and ￿
h;f
kl (’) are net pro￿ts a ￿rm with productivity ’ in sector h of
country k makes by serving market l by ‘classic’ exporting, ESFDI and HFDI respectively.
Individual ￿rm pro￿ts as a function of productivity can be obtained using the de￿nition of ￿rm
pro￿ts and the equilibrium price index from equation (2), which gives (again, sectoral indices
are dropped)
￿x
ij(’) = Ij ￿￿￿1
j ￿1￿￿
ij ￿1￿￿
ij ’￿￿1 ￿ fx
ij:
Pro￿ts from export-supporting FDI are given by
￿d
ij(’) = Ij ￿￿￿1
j ￿1￿￿
ij ’￿￿1 ￿ fd
ij:
And ￿rms transferring both distribution and production to j, make pro￿ts of
￿
f
ij(’) = Ij ￿￿￿1
j ’￿￿1 ￿ f
f
ij:
The constant Ij is de￿ned in appendix B. Evaluating the integrals and using the de￿nition of




















It is important to note that in equilibrium aggregate world pro￿ts depend on exogenous para-
meters and constants only.
30B Variable Trade Costs
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Figure 2: A decrease in variable trade costs increases the number of ￿rms choosing ESFDI on
both possible margins: lower variable costs decrease the incentive to do HFDI, so ￿rms close to
the cuto￿ switch to ESFDI (proximity-concentration e￿ect). With lower variable trade costs the
optimal sales volume of ‘classic’ exporters increases. For ￿rms close to the cuto￿ it now pays to
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Figure 3: This graph illustrates the countervailing e￿ects (on the extensive margin) of a fall in
variable trade costs on overall FDI sales. ESFDI sales increase by A + A0 + B while HFDI sales
decrease by B +C. Also taking into account the intensive margin, Proposition 4 shows formally
that the increase in ESFDI sales dominates the decrease in HFDI sales so that the overall FDI
sales increase unambiguously.
B.2 Variable Trade Costs: Proofs

















So that equation (1) can be written as fx
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Rij < 0: (12)
For notational convenience, also de￿ne
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> 0: (13)
Proof of Proposition 3




@￿ij < 0 follows directly from equation (6).




























@￿ij > 0 follows directly from equation (8).




@￿ij < 0 follows from (9).
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@￿ij > 0 follows form (11).
q.e.d
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@￿ij < 0 follows directly from Proposition 3 (i).











@￿ij < 0 follows directly from Proposition 3 (ii).
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Proof of Proposition 5






@￿ij < 0 follows directly from Proposition 3 (i).












, so that taking the partial derivative













@￿ij < 0 follows directly from Proposition 3 (ii).




























































34C Sectoral Structure of FDI:
Sectoral Groupings and Abbreviations
WZ MiDi code Description
DA EUT Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco
DB/DC TBL Textiles, apparel and leather goods
DE PVD Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing
DG CHE Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
DH GUK Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI GKV Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ MET Metal-working industry
DK MAS Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL ICT Manufacture of o￿ce machineries, computers, electrical and optical equipment
DM FZB Manufacture of transport equipment
DN MSR Manufacturing n.e.c.
G GRO+EIN (here: ‘Who/Ret’) Wholesale trade + Retail trade (incl. NACE 50)
Table 2: Sectoral abbreviations and classi￿cations used throughout the analysis. The corresponding
NACE codes can be found in Lipponer (2008), p. 24f.
Number of foreign a￿liates by sector of the parent and by sector of the a￿liate in 2001
sector a￿liate
parent DA DB/DC DE DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN Who/Ret ratio
Food DA 140 * * 148 1.06
Textiles DB/DC 196 * * * 3 319 1.63
Paper DE 206 * * * 137 0.67
Chemicals DG 859 10 * 9 9 * 864 1.01
Plastic DH * 3 4 * 322 7 3 4 21 * 196 0.61
Minerals DI 4 * * 6 219 * 4 * * 101 0.46
Metal DJ * * 12 * 432 15 3 12 * 437 1.01
Machinery DK 4 67 10 * 39 679 25 22 1364 2.01
Electr. Equip. DL * * 3 * 6 48 720 20 989 1.37
Transp. Equip. DM * 3 * 8 8 9 412 9 319 0.77
Other Mfg. DN * * 71 118 1.66
Table 3: Number of foreign a￿liates by sector of the German manufacturing parent and by sector of
the foreign a￿liate in 2001. Sectors DA-DN are manufacturing sectors (description in Table 2) sector
‘Who/Ret’ is wholesale and retail. The vast majority of a￿liates is either in the same manufacturing
sector as the parent or in wholesale and retail. Under ‘ratio’ the ratio of a￿liate sales in the wholesale
and retail sector (column ‘Who/Ret’) to a￿liate sales in the parent sector (diagonal) is reported.
35Employment of foreign a￿liates by sector of the parent and by sector of the a￿liate in 2001
sector a￿liate
parent DA DB/DC DE DG DH DI DJ DK DL DM DN Who/Ret ratio
Food DA 243 * * 46 0.19
Textiles DB/DC 534 * * * 7 200 0.37
Paper DE 198 * * * 47 0.24
Chemicals DG 2043 6 * 5 20 * 422 0.21
Plastic DH * 5 1 * 522 4 2 9 61 * 45 0.61
Minerals DI 16 * * 5 390 * 2 * * 30 0.09
Metal DJ * * 15 * 544 14 1 33 * 80 0.08
Machinery DK 1 132 27 * 49 1009 56 64 445 0.14
Electr. Equip. DL * * 1 * 7 263 2266 348 385 0.44
Transp. Equip. DM * 9 * 13 12 75 3871 166 454 0.77
Other Mfg. DN * * 71 17 0.17
Table 4: Employment of foreign a￿liates by sector of the German manufacturing parent and by sector of the
foreign a￿liate in 2001 (in hundreds). Sectors DA-DN are manufacturing sectors (description in Table 2) sector
‘Who/Ret’ is wholesale and retail. The most employment is reported either by a￿liates in the same manufacturing
sector as the parent or by a￿liates in wholesale and retail. Under ‘ratio’ the ratio of a￿liate sales in the wholesale
and retail sector (column ‘Who/Ret’) to a￿liate sales in the parent sector (diagonal) is reported. Note that
employment is a slightly problematic variable because it was not mandatory for ￿rms to report it before 2004.
Missing values were estimated by the Bundesbank based on sales volume.
36D ESFDI over Time and in Europe


















Affiliates with total assets above 0.5 millon Euro; top 0.1% of affiliates dropped
Number of affiliates over time: HFDI vs. ESFDI
mean of number_esfdi mean of number_hfdi


















Affiliates with total assets above 3 millon Euro; top 0.1% of affiliates dropped
Levels of affiliate sales over time: HFDI vs. ESFDI
mean of esfdi mean of hfdi


















Affiliates with total assets above 0.5 millon Euro; top 0.1% of affiliates dropped
W−Europe: Number of affiliates over time: HFDI vs. ESFDI
mean of number_esfdi mean of number_hfdi

















Affiliates with total assets above 0.5 millon Euro; top 0.1% of affiliates dropped
E−Europe: Number of affiliates over time: HFDI vs. ESFDI
mean of number_esfdi mean of number_hfdi
Figure 4: The four graphs plot the evolution of di￿erent FDI measures over time. Squares: ESFDI,
diamonds: HFDI. In all Figures a￿liates with the highest 0 :1% sales are dropped. The ￿rst graph presents
data on the number of a￿liates and keeps all a￿liates with total assets above 0.5 million Euro (1 million
DM). It illustrates that the increased reporting threshold has a more than proportional impact on the
number of ESFDI a￿liates (ESFDI jumps from above to below HFDI). The graph to the right plots
ESFDI and HFDI sales in a homogenized sample for a￿liates with total assets above 3 million Euro. The
graph in the lower left corner plots the number of a￿liates with total assets above 0 :5 million Euro for
Western Europe the last graph plots the same for Eastern Europe. The patterns for Eastern and Western
Europe di￿er substantially.
37E Cumulative Distribution Functions
Number of a￿liates and parents for ESFDI and HFDI by country in 2005
a￿liates parents
country ESFDI HFDI ￿ a￿ ESFDI HFDI ￿ parent #a￿>1 2 types #a￿>5
France 272 245 517 197 179 376 66 42 4
US 292 311 603 195 198 393 49 29 7
Italy 176 131 307 144 97 241 42 21 *
Japan 126 55 181 79 27 106 14 8 *
GB 192 151 343 159 114 273 31 20 *
Spain 138 158 296 88 118 206 33 16 *
Table 5: Decomposition of the data used to carry out the comparison of the CDFs. Columns 2-4 report
the number of ESFDI and HFDI a￿liates as well as their sum by destination market. The following
three columns (5-7) report the number of parents that are classi￿ed ‘ESFDI parents’ and ‘HFDI parents’
for the di￿erent markets. Column ‘#a￿>1’ reports the number of parents with more than one a￿liate
in the destination market. The column ‘2 types’ reports how many of these parents have both HFDI
and ESFDI a￿liates. Their share in the overall number of parents is quite low (c.f. column ‘￿ parent’).
Column ‘#a￿>5’ reports the number of parents with more than 5 a￿liates in the destination market.
To assure con￿dentiality, values of 0, 1 or 2 are replaced by *. Most parents serve the foreign markets


























































































Spain: CDFs of parent’s balance sheet total − in log*
Figure 5: These graphs show the cumulative distribution functions of total assets (in the MiDi labeling:
‘balance sheet total’) of German parents with a￿liates in France, Italy, US, Japan, Great Britain and
Spain.
39Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test
France US Italy Japan GB Spain
p1 = 0:550 p1 = 0:893 p1 = 0:613 p1 = 0:976 p1 = 0:434 p1 = 0:303
Total Assets p2 = 0:023 p2 = 0:008 p2 = 0:009 p2 = 0:089 p2 = 0:326 p2 = 0:496
pc = 0:046 pc = 0:015 pc = 0:017 pc = 0:178 pc = 0:630 pc = 0:589
p1 = 0:094 p1 = 0:449 p1 = 0:320 p1 = 0:944 p1 = 0:107 p1 = 0:212
Sales p2 = 0:017 p2 = 0:001 p2 = 0:031 p2 = 0:106 p2 = 0:442 p2 = 0:548
pc = 0:035 pc = 0:002 pc = 0:063 pc = 0:211 pc = 0:214 pc = 0:420
Table 6: This table reports results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for equality of distributions.
The ￿rst entry in a cell is the p-value of testing the null hypothesis that the ESFDI group contains smaller
observations than the HFDI group (in line with the model). The second value is the p-value for testing
the null that the HFDI group contains smaller observations than the ESFDI group (contradicting the
model). When this null is rejected (low p-value) this is evidence for ￿rst-order stochastic dominance of the
HFDI parent distribution. The third value is the p-value of the combined KS test that the distribution
are the same.
40F Impact of Distance
F.1 Distance as proxy for variable trade costs
This paragraph argues that using ratios of the di￿erent types of FDI as dependent variables,
some relatively mild assumptions on the distance dependence of the di￿erent cost types are
su￿cient to use distance as a proxy for variable trade costs only.























that all three ￿xed cost terms depend on distance. The impact of distance via the ￿xed costs







ij(dij). Here distance dij enters with opposite signs. Consider
for example the case that the ￿xed costs are multiples of each other (so that they have the



















x￿1 which is a constant and independent of dij. When considering ratios, distance-
dependence of the ￿xed costs does thus not seem to be a major concern.
A similar argument holds for a potential distance dependence of the distribution cost ￿ij. If it
is, just like variable trade costs increasing in distance, it will introduce an o￿setting impact of





. Considering e.g. the special
case of ￿ij ￿ ￿ij, the two e￿ects o￿set each other and the overall e￿ect of distance goes through
the remaining variable trade cost parameter ￿￿￿1.
Of course it cannot be taken for granted that the the ￿xed cost are exact multiples of each other
and that the two variable cost types are exactly equal. Nevertheless, the above considerations
show that (due to taking the ratios) each distance dependency of variables other than variable
trade costs has a countervailing e￿ect that tends to neutralize it. It thus appears justi￿ed to use
distance as a proxy for variable trade costs only.
41F.2 Estimation results
Impact of distance on the share of ESFDI in overall FDI




























































i ) ￿0:130￿￿ ￿0:684￿￿￿ sector
(0.064) (0.127) year
0.241 2787
Table 7: Sample 1 contains observations for majority owned a￿liates with a reporting threshold on
the a￿liates’ total assets of 0.5 million Euro from 1996 to 2001. Sample 2 reaches from 1996-2005,
all a￿liates with total assets below 3 million Euro (6 million DM) have been dropped to homogenize
the sample before and after the change in reporting requirements. In all speci￿cations coe￿cients are
estimated with weighted least squares using the size of the sub-groups underlying a particular year-sector-
destination observation to weight the variances. Standard errors (clustered by countries and robust to
heteroscedasticity) are reported in parenthesis ( ￿￿￿, ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively). Dependent variables are logarithms of the ratios of ESFDI sales and of the
number of ESFDI a￿liates. Independent variables are the log of bilateral distance between Germany
and the destination market and dEAST which is a dummy variable taking the value of unity when the
destination market is the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Poland or the Slovak Republic. Sample 1
includes 80 destination markets, sample 2 contains 73. A constant and dummies for year and the sector
of the parent company are included in all speci￿cations. Coe￿cients of the constant and the sectoral and
year dummies are not reported.
42Impact of distance on the share of ESFDI in overall FDI: robustness checks










































i ) ￿0:259￿￿￿ ￿0:842￿￿￿
1996-2001 (0.092) (0.248)
year 0.207 465
> 0:5 mio ￿0:065
sectoral (0.053)






















i ) ￿0:353￿￿￿ ￿0:960￿￿￿ sector
1996-2001 (0.103) (0.216) year
0.139 3629











i ) ￿0:131￿￿￿ ￿0:650￿￿￿ sector
(0.045) (0.102) year
0.312 3629
Table 8: This table presents some robustness checks to the baseline speci￿cation in Table 7. Sample
R1 adds the years 1989-1995 to sample 1 so that it reaches from 1989-2001. In sample R2 ‘number’
and ‘sales’ variables are summed across sectors, reducing the number of observations to one per year-
destination combination. Standard errors are clustered by countries (we have six years in the sample
and thus six observations per country). The overall number of destination markets is 87. In Sample R3
observations are kept even when only one type of a￿liates exists in a sector (these are dropped in the
baseline speci￿cation). To deal with the zeros in the ratios, the values of the ‘number’ and ‘sales’ variables
(nd, nf, Sd and Sf) are raised by one unit of measurement. Apart from this modi￿cation of the data,
the speci￿cation is identical to the baseline speci￿cation. The overall number of destination markets is
104 for the regression with Sd=(Sd + Sf) as dependent variable and 113 for the nd=(nd + nf).
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